# PRISONS NEGATIVE

## AT: OVERCROWDING

### 1NC

#### Their data on recidivism is exaggerated – the studies they cite suffer from selection bias.

Neyfakh 2015 Leon Staff Writer for Slate Interviewing William Rhoded "Why Do So Many Ex-Cons End Up Back in Prison? Maybe They Don’t, Says a Provocative New Study." Slate Magazine 29 Oct. <http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/crime/2015/10/why_do_so_many_prisoners_end_up_back_in_prison_a_new_study_says_maybe_they.html>

But what if the BJS’s findings have been fundamentally misunderstood? That’s the provocative contention of a recent paper published in the journal Crime & Delinquency, the title of which is “Following Incarceration, Most Released Offenders Never Return to Prison.” The paper, which was produced by researchers at the Cambridge, Massachusetts–based public policy firm Abt Associates and circulated online this week by criminal justice experts, argues that the conventional wisdom about recidivism in America is flatly wrong. In reality, the authors of the paper report, 2 out of 3 people who serve time in prison never come back, and only 11 percent come back multiple times. The reason for the shocking discrepancy between these new findings and those of the BJS, according to Abt’s William Rhodes, is that the BJS used a sample population in which repeat offenders were vastly overrepresented. I called Rhodes to ask him about why this happened and how he and his co-authors avoided the same problem in their analysis. His explanation for why the recidivism problem is not nearly as bad as many of us have believed is below; our conversation has been lightly edited and condensed. Let’s start with the conventional wisdom on recidivism in the U.S. What is it, and where did it come from? The conventional wisdom is that there’s a very high rate of recidivism, where recidivism is defined as being arrested for a new crime or having your community supervision status revoked for a technical violation. I know the Bureau of Justice Statistics has collected statistics on recidivism at least twice, maybe three times, and what they do is start with a sample of offenders who are released from prison during a given year, then match those release records with criminal history records to determine who recidivates. Then they compute their statistics—the rate at which the released offenders are arrested for new crimes and the rate at which they’re readmitted to prison—by observing the individuals in their sample over a period of some years. They’re not controversial statistics. There’s no manipulation that goes on. It’s purely tabulation. So the way it works is they choose a year and track a cohort of people in their sample and see who comes back? It seems pretty straightforward. That’s exactly right. So what’s wrong with their results? It is difficult to explain to a nonstatistician. I try to use an analogy: Suppose that I were asked to describe a population of people who go to shopping malls. What I might do is go to the mall and perform an “intercept survey”—that is, I’d randomly select people who are entering the mall and ask them about themselves—record their age, sex, race, and frequency of visiting the mall. The problem is, I’d probably do that over a pretty short period of time, like a week. So I’d get a lot of people who are frequent mall visitors and fewer people who aren’t. You know, if you go to a mall you’ll see an elderly population who go daily, to exercise by walking through the mall. You’ll also see a number of people who simply like malls, and maybe they go weekly. Or you’ll find, occasionally, people like me, who go about once a year when they need to buy a washing machine or something. If you did a simple tabulation of all the people you intercepted during a week you’d get a large proportion of frequent mall visitors. And they wouldn’t be representative of people who visit malls—they’d be representative of frequent mall visitors. And the same thing is happening with the Bureau of Justice Statistics when they take a sample of people who have been released from prison during a given year. Right. They’re not attempting to be misleading. What they’re reporting is true: If you take people who are released from prison during a given year, here’s the rate at which they’ll return. But it gets translated in people’s heads as, “Here’s what happens to offenders in general.” In truth what you have is two groups of offenders: those who repeatedly do crimes and accumulate in prisons because they get recaptured, reconvicted, and resentenced; and those who are much lower risk, and most of them will go to prison once and not come back. So the problem with taking a snapshot of a particular year, the way the BJS has done it, is you’re more likely to have people in your sample who come back a lot than you are to have people who don’t come back at all. That’s exactly right, yeah. What data is your study based on? At Abt Associates we assemble data into something called the National Corrections Reporting Program. It records prison terms for offenders across almost all of the states. For a large number of states, that data goes back to 2000. So we can observe when somebody enters and when somebody exits prison, and that allows us to look at individual offenders and say, “Given that they’ve been incarcerated at least once, how frequently do they come back?” So you’re looking at a large number of offenders, over a nearly 15-year period, and what you find is that most of those offenders do not come back. They’re incarcerated, they serve their term, they don’t return.

#### Single focus on education is insufficient to reduce recidivism – comprehensive approaches are key.

Orrick & Vieraitis 2015 Erin A. Department of Criminal Justice & Criminology, Sam Houston State University & Lynne M. University of Texas at Dallas “The Cost of Incarceration in Texas: Estimating the Benefits of Reducing the Prison Population” Am J Crim Just 40.2 proquest

As more offenders are released into the community, a greater importance will be placed on implementing successful reentry programs in prison and in the community to help ex-prisoners make successful transitions back into society. In the last decade there has been a renewed interest in reentry programs that has created an upsurge in new programs designed to address the many problems inmates face when returning to society (Austin, 2001). Many of the existing programs, however, have been focused on singular factors found to be associated with desistance (e.g., employment, substance abuse, education, and housing). Due to the complex nature of the problems faced by many of those who are returning to the community, many of these programs would require more comprehensive programming in order to improve chances of a successful outcome (Lattimore & Visher, 2009). These types of programs often offer participants structured and cohesive avenues to seek help in a variety of areas that are problematic for ex-offenders upon release from prison. Evaluations of programs that show promise include those that offer pre and post-release programs, which allow participants to maintain a continuity of assistance (Bloom, 2006; Finn, 1998; Lattimore, Whitte, & Baker, 1990; Menon, Blakely, Carmichael, & Silver, 1992; Turner & Petersilia, 1996).

#### Aff can’t solve – long history of over-criminalization prevents effective integration into society.

LoBuglio & RiehI 2015 Stefan F. director of corrections and reentry at the Council of State Governments & Anne Morrison professor in the Department of Economics and director of the Program in Criminal Justice at Rutgers “Unwinding Mass Incarceration” Issues in Science and Technology 32.1 proquest

It is a general truism that policy problems cannot be solved simply by stopping the action that yielded the problem. This is the case for the environmental degradation caused by toxic waste-and it is the case in mass incarceration. Due to changes in public policies and practices in recent decades, millions of people in the United States have criminal convictions, arrests, citations, and detentions in their histories, and this is not easily undone, stopped, or reversed. (It is a particular frustration that existing data systems do not allow the calculation of reliable estimates of just how many are in each of these categories.) And, as it currently operates, the criminal justice system frequently bases decisions not only on current conduct, but on one's past criminal history. As a result, the likelihood of detention while a case is resolved and the degree of punishment depend upon the official record of past encounters with the criminal justice system. This system has logic, as there is a significant body of evidence that demonstrates that the greatest predictor of future crimes is one's past criminal history. At the same time, without additional policy action, any events that resulted from the overly punitive enforcement environment of the past will long influence future levels of incarceration, stymying efforts to achieve proportionality or parsimony, much less the broader goals of social justice and citizenship that are being increasingly expressed in various quarters.

Employers, too, have begun to depend on criminal records as cheap and easy personnel screens. Often the decision is binary: application processes stop if there is the presence of a criminal history regardless on the nature of the specific offenses, the overall extent of criminal involvement, and how long ago it took place. Given the difficulty in interpreting criminal histories, the questionable accuracy of records in the county's disaggregated criminal justice records database systems, and the inconsistent and unreliable practices of the third-party companies that provide employers with criminal record information, employers can almost be forgiven for skirting Equal Employment Opportunity regulations and "ban the box" legislation that requires fair review of criminal offenses as they apply to the duties of a vacant position. The widespread use of criminal background checks has reduced the employment opportunities, particularly with larger companies with more robust human resource and legal departments. It is no surprise, then, that small employers are generally the ones who hire released prisoners, but at lower salaries, with fewer benefits, and in positions with less growth opportunity.

#### Federal prison population is declining

Gramlich 2017 John editor @ the Pew Research Center “Federal prison population fell during Obama’s term, reversing recent trend” 1/05 Pew Research Center <http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/01/05/federal-prison-population-fell-during-obamas-term-reversing-recent-trend/>

President Barack Obama is on pace to leave the White House with a smaller federal prison population than when he took office – a distinction no president since Jimmy Carter has had, according to a Pew Research Center analysis of data from the Bureau of Justice Statistics.

The number of sentenced prisoners in federal custody fell 5% (or 7,981 inmates) between the end of 2009, Obama’s first year in office, and 2015, the most recent year for which BJS has final, end-of-year statistics. Preliminary figures for 2016 show the decline continued during Obama’s last full year in office and that the overall reduction during his tenure will likely exceed 5%.

### Ext – Comprehensive Reform is Key

#### Aff is insufficient – comprehensive programs are necessary to prevent recidivism.

LoBuglio & RiehI 2015 Stefan F. director of corrections and reentry at the Council of State Governments & Anne Morrison professor in the Department of Economics and director of the Program in Criminal Justice at Rutgers “Unwinding Mass Incarceration” Issues in Science and Technology 32.1 proquest

As we have learned from our experiences-and as others have observed as well-unwinding mass incarceration requires much more than stopping current practices or reversing course by mass commutations and early release programs. Those most heavily involved in the criminal justice system will not succeed without the assistance of programs that provide services, discipline, and structure to guide their reintegration into society prior to and after their release. This will require a large, expensive, and politically challenging investment in an infrastructure of community-based correctional facilities throughout the country and especially near communities that receive a disproportionate share of returning prisoners. Ideally, the centers will be located near job and transportation centers, and be run by local correctional and public safety agencies.

No matter the policies introduced, the key to success will be strong leadership and public commitment. And we are particularly concerned that new policies be pragmatic, established in ways that account for the way their populations interact with other sectors of the criminal justice system as well as the larger social environment. Moving individuals from incarceration to community liberty without proper support and accountability can jeopardize not only the entire reform agenda, but also individuals and communities that are already fragile.

#### Debt cycles make recidivism inevitable

Curley 2016 Caitlin author at genfdk.org "Mass Incarceration: How the US Prison System Creates a Cycle of Poverty." [FKD]. 15 June 2016 http://www.genfkd.org/mass-incarceration-cycle-poverty

We all pay for mass incarceration. But those in or formerly in the criminal justice system can find their finances completely drained by the process. From the time someone is arrested and requires a lawyer, to the day they are released with housing or employment, the criminal justice system can cost thousands of dollars – and when former inmates are released, they can sometimes be left so financially crippled that they end up right back in jail. The arrest: Loss of income and court fees When someone is arrested, it can cost them big right off the bat. They are held in jail unless they can afford to pay bail to be released, which is often set high enough that this is impossible. The average cost of bail for a felony is $55,400, according to a 2009 study. Even when the bail is lower, it is still regularly out of reach for low-income arrestees and their families. A 2013 of New York City jail data found that more than 50 percent of jail inmates held until case disposition were in jail because they couldn’t afford bail of $2,500 or less. Most of these were misdemeanor cases. When someone is unable to pay their bail, they are held in jail until trial, which takes a national average of three to four months, according to the Pretrial Institute of Justice. Some states have a longer average; in New Jersey, it takes an average of 10 months before someone gets a trial. "Effectively, the state is paying to destabilize citizens and remove them from the workforce." Staying in jail for this long regularly costs arrestees their jobs and their housing, while it costs the state X amount of dollars to house them. Effectively, the state is paying to destabilize citizens and remove them from the workforce. The incarceration: Household items in prison, visiting and communication Once in prison, inmates must purchase everything aside from basic food items, including: hygiene items, snacks, postage supplies (to write letters), writing materials, vitamins and other personal items This is generally difficult for inmates to afford because most are completely unemployed, and those that do quality for in-prison work make an average of 92 cents an hour. They can get money sent from their families to pay for these things, but it can also be difficult for the family to pay because they lost the income of the inmate. Further, any money they send will have fees tacked onto it by private companies. For example, JPay tack fees onto any money sent by families, usually around 35 percent and sometimes as high as 50 percent. Then, in order to communicate with their families via phone, they must pay huge fees that are also decided by private companies. These fees were reaching as high as $6.95 for 15 minutes in some states until the Federal Communications Commission capped it at $1.65 last year. The release and lasting debt of incarceration When an inmate is released, it can be extremely difficult to find employment, as many employers will disqualify anyone with a criminal history. With no income and with a negative background check, former inmates are often unable to find housing and pay for food and health needs. A 2015 study by the Ella Baker Center revealed that the average debt incurred for court-related fines and fees is $13,607. For an inmate unable to find work, this can leave them and/or their family financially crippled for the rest of their life.

### Ext – Prison Population Down

#### Prison populations are down now.

Obama 2017 Barack former president of the US and constitutional law scholar “Commentary: The President’s Role in Advancing Criminal Justice Reform” Harvard Law Review lexis

There is so much work to be done. Yet I remain hopeful that together, we are moving in the right direction. Crime remains near historic lows, prison populations are decreasing, taxpayer dollars are being better spent, and more Americans are landing on their feet and taking advantage of the second chances they've earned. It's critical we build on this in the ways I've outlined above. But at the end of the day, those entrusted with influence over the direction of the criminal justice system must also remember that reform is about more than the dollars we spend and the data we collect. How we treat those who [\*866] have made mistakes speaks to who we are as society and is a statement about our values -- about our dedication to fairness, equality, and justice, and about how to protect our families and communities from harm, heal after loss and trauma, and lift back up those among us who have earned a chance at redemption.

#### Prison populations are declining - long term trends

The Hill 1/03/2017 “US prison population falling as crime rates stay low” <http://thehill.com/homenews/news/312480-us-prison-population-falling-as-crime-rates-stay-low>

The number of inmates held by the federal Bureau of Prisons declined seven percent over the last year, while the number of inmates held by state prison systems declined by nearly two percent. Twenty-nine states showed a drop in prison populations.

The long-term trends are even more encouraging: Between 2010 and 2015, the nation’s imprisonment rate declined by 8.4 percent, according to an analysis by the Pew Charitable Trusts. Over the same period, 35 states have seen their prison populations decline, and the rate of violent and property crime is down nearly 15 percent.

## AT: FRAMING

### 1NC

#### Apocalyptic rhetoric leads to activism that averts catastrophe – studies prove robust correlation

Veldman 12 – doctoral candidate in the Religion and Nature program at the University of Florida (Robin Globus, “Narrating the Environmental Apocalypse”, Volume 17, Number 1, Spring 2012, Ethics & the Environment, online, MCR)

Environmental Apocalypticism and Activism¶ As we saw in the introduction, critics often argue that apocalyptic rhetoric induces feelings of hopelessness or fatalism. While it certainly does for some people, in this section I will present evidence that apocalypticism also often goes hand in hand with activism.¶ Some of the strongest evidence of a connection between environmental apocalypticism and activism comes from a national survey that examined whether Americans perceived climate change to be dangerous. As part of his analysis, Anthony Leiserowitz identified several “interpretive communities,” which had consistent demographic characteristics but varied in their levels of risk perception. The group who perceived the risk to be the greatest, which he labeled “alarmists,” described climate change [End Page 5] using apocalyptic language, such as “Bad…bad…bad…like after nuclear war…no vegetation,” “Heat waves, it’s gonna kill the world,” and “Death of the planet” (2005, 1440). Given such language, this would seem to be a reasonable way to operationalize environmental apocalypticism. If such apocalypticism encouraged fatalism, we would expect alarmists to be less likely to have engaged in environmental behavior compared to groups with moderate or low levels of concern. To the contrary, however, Leiserowitz found that alarmists “were significantly more likely to have taken personal action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions” (ibid.) than respondents who perceived climate change to pose less of a threat. Interestingly, while one might expect such radical views to appeal only to a tiny minority, Leiserowitz found that a respectable eleven percent of Americans fell into this group (ibid).¶ Further supporting Leiserowitz’s findings, in a separate national survey conducted in 2008, Maibach, Roser-Renouf, and Leiserowitz found that a group they labeled “the Alarmed” (again, due to their high levels of concern about climate change) “are the segment most engaged in the issue of global warming. They are very convinced it is happening, human-caused, and a serious and urgent threat. The Alarmed are already making changes in their own lives and support an aggressive national response” (2009, 3, emphasis added). This group was far more likely than people with lower levels of concern over climate change to have engaged in consumer activism (by rewarding companies that support action to reduce global warming with their business, for example) or to have contacted elected officials to express their concern. Additionally, the authors found that “[w]hen asked which reason for action was most important to them personally, the Alarmed were most likely to select preventing the destruction of most life on the planet (31%)” (2009, 31)—a finding suggesting that for many in this group it is specifically the desire to avert catastrophe, rather than some other motivation, that encourages pro-environmental behavior. Taken together, these and other studies (cf. Semenza et al. 2008 and DerKarabetia, Stephenson, and Poggi 1996) provide important evidence that many of those who think environmental problems pose a severe threat practice some form of activism, rather than giving way to fatalistic resignation.

#### Talking about the possibility of extinction is vital to strategies to prevent it

Sandberg, Matheny & Cirkovic, 8 – Anders Sandberg, James Martin Research Fellow at the Future of Humanity Institute at Oxford University, postdoctoral research assistant for the EU Enhance project; Jason G. Matheny, PhD candidate in Health Policy and Management at Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health, special consultant to the Center for Biosecurity at the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center and co-founder of New Harvest, and Milan M. Ćirković, senior research associate at the Astronomical Observatory of Belgrade, assistant professor of physics at the University of Novi Sad in Serbia and Montenegro; “How Can We Reduce the Risk of Human Extinction” http://thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/how-can-we-reduce-the-risk-of-human-extinction

Perhaps least controversial, we should invest more in efforts to enumerate the risks to human survival and the means to mitigate them. We need more interdisciplinary research in quantitative risk assessment, probability theory, and technology forecasting. And we need to build a worldwide community of experts from various fields concerned about global catastrophic risks. Human extinction may, in the long run, be inevitable. But just as we work to secure a long life for individuals, even when our eventual death is assured, we should work to secure a long life for our species.

#### Evaluation of consequences is the utmost ethical act – their ethic allows infinite violence

Williams Professor of International Politics at the University of Wales—Aberystwyth 2005 Michael The Realist Tradition and the Limits of International Relations p. 174-176

A commitment to an ethic of consequences reflects a deeper ethic of criticism, of ‘self-clarification’, and thus of reflection upon the values adopted by an individual or a collectivity. It is part of an attempt to make critical evaluation an intrinsic element of responsibility. Responsibility to this more fundamental ethic gives the ethic of consequences meaning. Consequentialism and responsibility are here drawn into what Schluchter, in terms that will be familiar to anyone conversant with constructivism in International Relations, has called a ‘reflexive principle’. In the wilful Realist vision, scepticism and consequentialism are linked in an attempt to construct not just a more substantial vision of political responsibility, but also the kinds of actors who might adopt it, and the kinds of social structures that might support it. A consequentialist ethic is not simply a choice adopted by actors: it is a means of trying to foster particular kinds of self-critical individuals and societies, and in so doing to encourage a means by which one can justify and foster a politics of responsibility. The ethic of responsibility in wilful Realism thus involves a commitment to both autonomy and limitation, to freedom and restraint, to an acceptance of limits and the criticism of limits. Responsibility clearly involves prudence and an accounting for current structures and their historical evolution; but it is not limited to this, for it seeks ultimately the creation of responsible subjects within a philosophy of limits. Seen in this light, the Realist commitment to objectivity appears quite differently. Objectivity in terms of consequentialist analysis does not simply take the actor or action as given, it is a political practice — an attempt to foster a responsible self, undertaken by an analyst with a commitment to objectivity which is itself based in a desire to foster a politics of responsibility. Objectivity in the sense of coming to terms with the ‘reality’ of contextual conditions and likely outcomes of action is not only necessary for success, it is vital for self-reflection, for sustained engagement with the practical and ethical adequacy of one’s views. The blithe, self-serving, and uncritical stances of abstract moralism or rationalist objectivism avoid self-criticism by refusing to engage with the intractability of the world ‘as it is’. Reducing the world to an expression of their theoretical models, political platforms, or ideological programmes, they fail to engage with this reality, and thus avoid the process of self-reflection at the heart of responsibility. By contrast, Realist objectivity takes an engagement with this intractable ‘object’ that is not reducible to one’s wishes or will as a necessary condition of ethical engagement, self-reflection, and self-creation.7 Objectivity is not a naïve naturalism in the sense of scientific laws or rationalist calculation; it is a necessary engagement with a world that eludes one’s will. A recognition of the limits imposed by ‘reality’ is a condition for a recognition of one’s own limits — that the world is not simply an extension of one’s own will. But it is also a challenge to use that intractability as a source of possibility, as providing a set of openings within which a suitably chastened and yet paradoxically energised will to action can responsibly be pursued. In the wilful Realist tradition, the essential opacity of both the self and the world are taken as limiting principles. Limits upon understanding provide chastening parameters for claims about the world and actions within it. But they also provide challenging and creative openings within which diverse forms of life can be developed: the limited unity of the self and the political order is the precondition for freedom. The ultimate opacity of the world is not to be despaired of: it is a condition of possibility for the wilful, creative construction of selves and social orders which embrace the diverse human potentialities which this lack of essential or intrinsic order makes possible.8 But it is also to be aware of the less salutary possibilities this involves. Indeterminacy is not synonymous with absolute freedom — it is both a condition of, and imperative toward, responsibility.

### Extensions – Apocalyptic Framing Good

#### Apocalyptic rhetoric should be part of policy making – it reminds us of the stakes

Tonn & Tonn 2009 Bruce Department of Political Science, University of Tennessee & Jenna Department of the History of Science, Harvard University “A literary human extinction scenario” Futures 41.10 Science Direct

Mary Wollstonecraft Shelley (1797–1851) is most well known for her first novel, Frankenstein, which was published in 1818 and is considered , among other things, the first piece of science fiction in English literature [1]. In 1826, she published her third novel entitled The Last Man [2] an epic narrative about the destruction of the human race. This book, which is the subject of this essay, was among the first literary works to explore the apocalypse. MWS’s human extinction scenario was one of the most percipient and path breaking and therefore should be required reading for futurists. During the course of the novel, humanity is extinguished by the Plague1 and the main character Lionel Verney suffers the loss of all that humankind had accomplished: art, music, literature, and politics. This profound sense of cultural loss rarely makes it into our current policy discussions about climate change, pandemics and other threats to humanity. It should, though, in order to remind us of the stakes involved in protecting the future of the human race. This paper provides a synopsis of the novel, observations about how this literary work is relevant to futurists today, and a literary analysis of this and other similar apocalyptic writings.

#### Apocalyptic scenario planning is good - Even if the predictions are off, the process remedies powerlessness and does help mobilize against real danger.

Tonn & Tonn 2009 Bruce Department of Political Science, University of Tennessee & Jenna Department of the History of Science, Harvard University “A literary human extinction scenario” Futures 41.10 Science Direct

As we have seen, human extinction scenarios today fit into a long secular and religious history of writing about the apocalypse. The question then becomes: what makes people use the narrative model of the apocalypse as seen in the Old and New Testaments to tell their own stories? A number have scholars have discussed this question. David Ketterer, who studies the apocalyptic mode in American literature, believes that ‘‘apocalyptic literature is concerned with the creation of other worlds which exist, on the literal level, in a credible relationship (whether on the basis of rational extrapolation and analogy or of religious belief) with the ‘real’ world, thereby causing a metaphorical destruction of that ‘real’ world in the reader’s head’’. Furthermore, W. Warren Wagar, a historian and futures scholar who published many books including A Short History of the Future, wrote ‘‘that eschatological fictions help us cope with the fear of death and compensate us for our powerlessness’’. Wagar’s work on the apocalypse relates closely to the subject of MWS’s novel. He argued ‘‘The last man, or one of a handful of last men, is a figure of immeasurable power and importance’’ [18]. David Seed, the editor of an anthology of articles on apocalypse theory, cites Frank Kermode’s The Sense of an Ending in his discussion of the usefulness of apocalypse narratives. According to Seed, Kermode believes that the ‘‘apocalypse depends on a concord of imaginatively recorded past and imaginatively predicted future, achieved on behalf of us, who remain ‘in the middest’’’. Kermode’s ‘‘central insight’’ into apocalypse theory is that the ‘‘apocalypse [is] a narrative, one of the fictions which we employ to make sense of our present’’. Furthermore, ‘‘there is a necessary relation between the fictions by which we order our world and the increasing complexity of what we take to be the ‘real’ history of the world’’ Relating to this point, Lois Parkinson Zamora writes that ‘‘the apocalyptist assigns to event after event a place in a pattern of historical relationships that. . .presses steadily towards culmination’’ [19]. Thus, the apocalypse is a literary device that humans turn to both to comprehend more fully their place in the world and to impress upon others the conditions of the ‘‘real’’ world which must be changed to ensure the future of humanity.

### Extensions - Warming Specific

#### Climate apocalypticism encourages activism – aff authors have it backwards

Veldman 12 – doctoral candidate in the Religion and Nature program at the University of Florida (Robin Globus, “Narrating the Environmental Apocalypse”, Volume 17, Number 1, Spring 2012, Ethics & the Environment, online, MCR)

While it may be true that environmentally apocalyptic rhetoric turns¶ some people away from the movement, or that it superficially resembles¶ apocalypticism based on Biblical prophecies, this is not all it does. In fact,¶ there is ample evidence that environmentally apocalyptic views are often¶ associated with activism. Yet while it is not surprising that those who¶ believe the environmental situation is dire tend to want to do something¶ about it, this “positive” (in an environmental sense) function has barely¶ been recognized or explored as dependent on or deriving from an apocalyptic¶ worldview. Instead, apart from a few important exceptions (e.g.¶ Barkun 1983; Killingsworth and Palmer 1996; Taylor 1991 and 1994;¶ Thompson 2009), discussions about apocalypticism in the environmental¶ movement have been dominated largely by critics of it. What these critics¶ have missed is that a fair amount of environmental activism occurs not¶ despite apocalypticism but because of it. In this paper I argue that this¶ may be so because the notion of imminent apocalypse provides a moral¶ to the environmental story—that humans must fundamentally alter their¶ relationship with the natural world—and in so doing furnishes a point of¶ view from which people can determine what constitutes environmentally¶ ethical behavior. I further suggest that the apocalyptic narrative functions¶ as a folk version of consequentialism.¶ By examining environmental apocalypticism from this perspective, I¶ aim to recast its persistence not as cause for concern, but as cause for more¶ judicious reflection upon, and perhaps even appreciation of, apocalypticism’s¶ function within the environmental community. Through this case¶ study I also hope to encourage further work in descriptive environmental¶ ethics. This empirical work would complement the significant advances¶ environmental ethicists have made in the areas of normative and metaethics¶ over the past several decades.

### Extensions – Consequentialism

#### Political responsibility requires a consideration of consequences

Jeffrey Isaac, James H. Rudy Professor of Political Science and director of the Center for the Study of Democracy and Public Life at Indiana University, Bloomington, Spring 2002, Dissent, vol. 49, no. 2

As writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Max Weber, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hannah Arendt have taught, an unyielding concern with moral goodness undercuts political responsibility. The concern may be morally laudable, reflecting a kind of personal integrity, but it suffers from three fatal flaws: (1) It fails to see that the purity of one's intention does not ensure the achievement of what one intends. Abjuring violence or refusing to make common cause with morally compromised parties may seem like the right thing; but if such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the clean conscience of their supporters; (2) it fails to see that in a world of real violence and injustice, moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness; it is often a form of complicity in injustice. This is why, from the standpoint of politics--as opposed to religion--pacifism is always a potentially immoral stand. In categorically repudiating violence, it refuses in principle to oppose certain violent injustices with any effect; and (3) it fails to see that politics is as much about unintended consequences as it is about intentions; it is the effects of action, rather than the motives of action, that is most significant. Just as the alignment with "good" may engender impotence, it is often the pursuit of "good" that generates evil. This is the lesson of communism in the twentieth century: it is not enough that one's goals be sincere or idealistic; it is equally important, always, to ask about the effects of pursuing these goals and to judge these effects in pragmatic and historically contextualized ways. Moral absolutism inhibits this judgment. It alienates those who are not true believers. It promotes arrogance. And it undermines political effectiveness. WHAT WOULD IT mean for the American left right now to take seriously the centrality of means in politics? First, it would mean taking seriously the specific means employed by the September 11 attackers--terrorism. There is a tendency in some quarters of the left to assimilate the death and destruction of September 11 to more ordinary (and still deplorable) injustices of the world system--the starvation of children in Africa, or the repression of peasants in Mexico, or the continued occupation of the West Bank and Gaza by Israel. But this assimilation is only possible by ignoring the specific modalities of September 11. It is true that in Mexico, Palestine, and elsewhere, too many innocent people suffer, and that is wrong. It may even be true that the experience of suffering is equally terrible in each case. But neither the Mexican nor the Israeli government has ever hijacked civilian airliners and deliberately flown them into crowded office buildings in the middle of cities where innocent civilians work and live, with the intention of killing thousands of people. Al-Qaeda did precisely this. That does not make the other injustices unimportant. It simply makes them different. It makes the September 11 hijackings distinctive, in their defining and malevolent purpose--to kill people and to create terror and havoc. This was not an ordinary injustice. It was an extraordinary injustice. The premise of terrorism is the sheer superfluousness of human life. This premise is inconsistent with civilized living anywhere. It threatens people of every race and class, every ethnicity and religion. Because it threatens everyone, and threatens values central to any decent conception of a good society, it must be fought. And it must be fought in a way commensurate with its malevolence. Ordinary injustice can be remedied. Terrorism can only be stopped. Second, it would mean frankly acknowledging something well understood, often too eagerly embraced, by the twentieth century Marxist left--that it is often politically necessary to employ morally troubling means in the name of morally valid ends. A just or even a better society can only be realized in and through political practice; in our complex and bloody world, it will sometimes be necessary to respond to barbarous tyrants or criminals, with whom moral suasion won't work. In such situations our choice is not between the wrong that confronts us and our ideal vision of a world beyond wrong. It is between the wrong that confronts us and the means--perhaps the dangerous means--we have to employ in order to oppose it. In such situations there is a danger that "realism" can become a rationale for the Machiavellian worship of power. But equally great is the danger of a righteousness that translates, in effect, into a refusal to act in the face of wrong. What is one to do? Proceed with caution. Avoid casting oneself as the incarnation of pure goodness locked in a Manichean struggle with evil. Be wary of violence. Look for alternative means when they are available, and support the development of such means when they are not. And never sacrifice democratic freedoms and open debate. Above all, ask the hard questions about the situation at hand, the means available, and the likely effectiveness of different strategies. Most striking about the campus left's response to September 11 was its refusal to ask these questions. Its appeals to "international law" were naive. It exaggerated the likely negative consequences of a military response, but failed to consider the consequences of failing to act decisively against terrorism. In the best of all imaginable worlds, it might be possible to defeat al-Qaeda without using force and without dealing with corrupt regimes and political forces like the Northern Alliance. But in this world it is not possible. And this, alas, is the only world that exists. To be politically responsible is to engage this world and to consider the choices that it presents. To refuse to do this is to evade responsibility. Such a stance may indicate a sincere refusal of unsavory choices. But it should never be mistaken for a serious political commitment.

## POLITICS LINK

#### Only conservative prison reform is bipartisan – the aff is unpopular.

Fabelo & Thompson 2015 Tony & Michael director of research and director of the Council of State Governments Justice Center “Reducing Incarceration Rates: When Science Meets Political Realities” Issues in Science and Technology 32.1 proquest

Lesson Two. Research-based recommendations that appear to have the singular goal of significantly reducing the prison population, regardless of the financial savings that would be generated, rarely attract broad, bipartisan support in the states. Similarly, a policy reform package presented to reduce the prison population purely for social justice reasons is typically insufficient to motivate elected officials across the political spectrum. Broad bipartisan support for policy changes that will reduce the prison population is generally contingent on the endorsement of (or at least the absence of concerted opposition from) a cross-section of stakeholders in the criminal justice system, including law enforcement, victim advocates, and other local o cials. These constituencies are most inclined to lend such support when they are assured that the policy reforms recommended will strengthen the criminal justice system.

## NEOLIBERALISM LINKS

#### Cost cutting measures are an example of neoliberal prison reform – their approach to reform further entrenches the carceral state.

McLeod 2017 Allegra Professor of Law Georgetown University Law Center “REVIEW ESSAY: Beyond the Carceral State” Texas Law Review lexis

Neoliberal penal reform threatens to disguise, while further entrenching, the carceral state. Although neoliberal penal reform may advance the cause of decarceration in some measure, mainly by attracting more adherents to the cause, its underlying values and fiscally regressive orientation are at odds with the social turn in public policy that would be necessary to constitute forms of governance beyond our carceral state.

#### Formulating prison policy around government cost cutting reinforces the criminalization.

McLeod 2017 Allegra Professor of Law Georgetown University Law Center “REVIEW ESSAY: Beyond the Carceral State” Texas Law Review lexis

But Gottschalk gives short shrift to the ways in which decarceration paired with regressive fiscal reform threatens to deepen immiseration inside and outside of prisons in ways fundamentally at odds with dismantling the carceral state. Though Gottschalk persuasively demonstrates that it should be possible in principle to substantially reduce incarceration through comprehensive sentencing reform without resolving more fundamental "structural problems," a criminal law reform program organized around reduced government spending, without other animating social goals, tends toward concealment and displacement of incarceration and the expansion of other trends that reinforce overcriminalization and penal severity. n76

#### Neoliberal prison reform shifts criminalization from the prison to the conditions of poverty

McLeod 2017 Allegra Professor of Law Georgetown University Law Center “REVIEW ESSAY: Beyond the Carceral State” Texas Law Review lexis

Regressive fiscal and antiregulatory commitments associated with Texas's cost-cutting reforms also interfere with meaningful decarceration in other respects, exacerbating the criminalization of poverty. The case of [\*674] debt-related incarceration serves as a notable example. As Gottschalk explores, when criminal law reform is organized around an effort to reduce state expenditures, pressures increase to charge defendants and convicted persons fines and fees to subsidize the costs of the criminal process. n114 But beyond criminal legal debt, a regressive fiscal and antiregulatory agenda exacerbates other dimensions of the criminalization of poverty. For instance, payday lenders--who profit on the economic precarity of low-income people who require small, short-term loans to cover basic expenses--thrive in an environment where there is a minimal social safety net for those in desperate economic straits and a meager regulatory apparatus to constrain collections practices. Texas payday loan businesses have routinely engaged in the unlawful use of criminal charges to collect debts in violation of state laws governing the operations of credit-access businesses and the filing of such criminal charges, as well as state and federal fair debt collection laws. n115 Over 1,500 criminal complaints of bad check and theft by check were filed by thirteen payday lenders between January 2012 and 2014 in Texas--sometimes resulting in jailing of debtors. n116 In one bad-check case, the court ordered payment of $ 918.91 for a defaulted $ 225 payday loan. n117 In another case, in November 2012, Cristina McHan defaulted on a $ 200 loan from Cash Biz outside Houston; she was arrested, pled guilty, and was assessed a further $ 305 in court costs and fines. n118 McHan ultimately "paid off the debt in part by serving a night in jail. n119

## ABOLITION K

### 1NC

#### Prison reform is a classic strategy of the Left. The affirmatives focus on prison education obscures criticism and activism to confront the domestic war white supremacy is waging on black and brown folks.

Rodriguez 2010 Dylan University of California – Riverside “The Terms of Engagement: Warfare, White Locality, and Abolition.” Critical Sociology

Thus, the political rubric and analytical category of ‘(anti-) immigrant’ criminalization, detention, policing has become both a critically necessary and theoretically troubling discursive terrain. On the one hand, the racist criminalization and domestic pursuit of (assumptively) brown migrants and/or racially coded ‘alien/undocumented’ bodies is a classical technology of the US white supremacist state. In this sense, a situated historical examination of how this racist statecraft articulates particularly and peculiarly to our political moment is clearly crucial to understanding, effectively resisting, and radically critiquing the specific edifices of US state violence in their most common institutional terms: Homeland Security, border policing, wars on (immigrant) gangs, and ‘illegal immigrant’ control. On the other hand, the rubric of ‘immigrant rights’ – to the extent that it focuses largely on (non-black and non-indigenous) racial criminalization’s of Mexican, Latino/a and Middle Eastern border crossers – runs the risk of reconstituting the fetishized political category and vexed rhetoric of an alleged ‘post-9/11’ (racial) era. As I have elaborated more extensively elsewhere (Rodríguez 2008) this political-discursive structure suggests, and sometimes explicitly asserts, the emergence of multiple ‘new’ forms of racist state violence in the context of a ‘War on Terror’, and often relies on an exceptionalism, ahistorical narration of anti-immigrant civil and state violence in order to distinguish immigrant criminalization/detention from other, more politically normalized forms of institutionalized racist dehumanization. This myopic analytical approach displaces – and pragmatically obstructs – the difficult praxis of conceptualizing immigrant criminalization within the organic logic of the totality of US white Supremacist state violence, as addressed in the incisive work of such scholar activists as Davíd Manuel Hernandez (2008), Martha Escobar (2008), and others. Rodríguez: The Terms of Engagement 167. Thus, behind the din of progressive and liberal reformist struggles over public policy, civil liberties, and law, and beneath the infrequent mobilizations of activity to defend against the next onslaught of racist, classist, ageist, and misogynist criminalization, there is an unspoken politics of assumption that takes for granted the mystified permanence of domestic warfare as a constant production of targeted and massive suffering, guided by the logic of normalized and mundane black, brown, and indigenous subjection to the expediencies and essential violence of the American (global) nation-building project. To put it differently: despite the unprecedented forms of imprisonment, social and political repression, and violent policing that compose the mosaic of our historical time, the establishment left (within and perhaps beyond the USA) really does not care to envision, much less politically prioritize, the abolition of US domestic warfare and its structuring white supremacist social logic as its most urgent task of the present and future. The non-profit and NGO left, in particular, seems content to engage in desperate (and usually well-intentioned) attempts to manage the casualties of domestic warfare, foregoing the urgency of an abolitionist praxis that openly, critically, and radically addresses the moral, cultural, and political premises of these wars. In so many ways, the US progressive/left establishment is filling the void created by what Ruth Wilson Gilmore has called the violent ‘abandonments’ of the state, which forfeits and implodes its own social welfare capacities (which were already insufficient at best) while transforming and (productively) exploding its domestic war making functionalities – which Gilmore (2007b: 44–5) says are guided by a ‘frightening willingness to engage in human sacrifice’. Yet, at the same time that the state has been openly galvanizing itself to declare and wage violent struggle against strategically targeted local populations, the establishment left remains relatively unwilling and therefore institutionally unable to address the questions of social survival, grass roots mobilization, radical social justice, and social transformation on the concrete and everyday terms of the very domestic war(s) that the state has so openly and repeatedly declared as the premises of its own coherence. Given that domestic warfare composes both the common narrative language and concrete material production of the state, the question remains as to why the establishment left has not understood this statecraft as the state of emergency that the condition so openly, institutionally encompasses (war!). Perhaps it is because critical intellectuals, scholar activists, and progressive organizers are underestimating the skill and reach of the state as a pedagogical (teaching) apparatus, that they have generally under theorized how the state so skillfully generates (and often politically accommodates) sanctioned spaces of political contradiction that engulf ‘dissent’ and counter-state, antiracist, and antiviolence organizing.

#### Focusing on this structural on-going war against black and brown folks is necessary to struggle against white supremacy

Rodríguez Professor and Chair of the Department of Ethnic Studies at UC Riverside 2010 Dylan “The Terms of Engagement: Warfare, White Locality, and Abolition” Critical Sociology 36:1 Sage Publishing Online

‘War,’ such a common term in the global lexicon, is arguably among the least rigorously theorized and most willfully misunderstood concepts of our historical present. The social intercourse of the USA simultaneously presumes a relatively coherent consensus comprehension of ‘war’, while reflexively (and often obsessively) dislocating its localities of violence to sites alien from and devoutly foreign to the proximate sites of the US homeland. Wherein the comprehension of the militarizations of the ‘War on Terror’ if not constantly displaced onto the elsewhere (non-local) spectacles of Abu Ghraib, Guantanamo, Fallujah, and Bagram? What to make of the rhetorically saturated, localized ‘wars’ on ‘gangs’, ‘drugs’, ‘poverty’, and ‘illegal immigration’ of the last few decades if the organic statecraft therein does not merely entail the multiple political articulations of intensified policing and state intervention, but focally encompasses mobilizations of the legitimated excesses of the racist state in an orchestrated violence that is no less fatal than that of actual civil war?

My concern in this essay is with contextualizing and resituating the profound state and state-ordained violences of those proliferating warfare technologies that have been rendered mundane, acceptable, and banal within the nuances of the American ‘domestic’ social formation in the late 20th and early 21st centuries. More precisely, I wish to bring analytical and theoretical attention to the organized human fatalities and orchestrated subjections of racially pathologized social subjects that are essential to white supremacist nationbuilding, even and especially within the historical conjuncture of the multiculturalist racist state’s emergence as the hegemonic institutional phenotype of the USA. Thus, what might a radical sociology, antiracist praxis, and social theory contribute to a critical reframing of the white supremacist state as something that has neither obsolesced nor decomposed, as if simply a relic of an earlier, vulgar moment in US racial formation (Omi andWinant 1994),1 but has reinvigorated and recomposed its animus of dominance through a symbiosis of multiculturalist incorporations/empowerments and political enhancement of a statecraft that is durably and foundationally racist? – Here, I follow scholar activist and political geographer Ruthie Gilmore’s clarifying definition of racism as ‘the state-sanctioned and/or extra-legal production and exploitation of group-differentiated vulnerabilities to premature death’ (Gilmore 2002: 261).

In spite of, or perhaps because of, the recent proliferation of ‘antiwar’ liberal and progressive discourses challenging the militarized US global regime of the Bush Administration’s War on Terror, the circumstances, scenes, and locations of warfare have been insidiously periodized and re-sited – not incidentally by the ‘antiwar’ left itself – to the nominal historical and geographic exteriors of the USA. There is a political-discursive circuit bridging the extra-national and global military mobilizations of the US state, including its knowledge-producing and violence-enhancing techniques, and the loyal opposition and dissension of the establishment US left to a state-induced global ‘war’ that it alleges is being conducted under false, flawed, or immoral pretensions. The energy conducted by this political-discursive circuit (as with all functioning circuits) reproduces each of the nominally opposed elements of its bridge while, uniquely, generating bodies of social thought (embodied by scholars, pundits, activists, state figures, and public media forms) and political performances (rallies, ‘antiwar’ agendas/manifestos, and rituals of public debate) that instruct a particular common sense of what ‘war’ is.

This common sense obscures and consistently disavows the material continuities between state-formed technologies of warmaking across historical moments and geographies, while re-forming the US ‘Homeland’ as a place of relative ‘peace’ – or at least as a place that is not at war – wherein state-produced and state-proctored institutionalizations of massive racist violence are unrecognizable as such, and articulations of the current emergencies of domestic warfare – e.g. by prison and penal abolitionists (Critical Resistance Publications Collective 2000), radical women of color antiviolence activists (INCITE! Women of Color Against Violence 2006), and imprisoned radicals and revolutionaries (Hames-Garcia 2004; Rodríguez 2006) – are held with suspicion as the allegations of those (simply) unwilling to concede the fundamental tenability and universal reformability of the US social and state forms.

I am thus addressing a modality of war that is most often contained and disappeared into the categorically unremarkable: that which is so taken-for-granted, assumed so organic to the production of the social landscape, that it is quite literally not worthy of extended remark, much less sustained critical comment or analysis. As such, this historical present is a warfare mosaic that refuses simplifying categorization precisely because its composition absorbs the identification of its observers, and (following Althusser’s formulation) ‘hails’ social subjects with individualizing narratives of national vindication. The discursive techniques of this war subsume regularly available, locally recognizable artifacts of martial law (e.g. announced and valorized police roundups of ‘gangs’ and ‘illegal aliens’), a racist police state (euphemized as ‘racial profiling’), and deeply political or proto-political civil insurrection (e.g. rioting, cop assassination, and property destruction) under the rubrics of law, policing, justice, and (most importantly) ‘peace’ or ‘peacekeeping’. In the context of this political-cultural ‘national’ production, ordinary people are not merely witnesses to state-waged atrocity in their midst, but are (sometimes overlappingly) its participants, enablers, victims, and strategists.

#### White supremacy serves as the genocidal foundation for American social reproduction

Rodríguez Professor and Chair of the Department of Ethnic Studies at UC Riverside 2010 Dylan “The Terms of Engagement: Warfare, White Locality, and Abolition” Critical Sociology 36:1 Sage Publishing Online

White supremacist political, cultural, and economic formations are utterly foundational to the emergence and national-social reproduction of the USA, and are an indelible component of American institutionalities more generally. Here, as in prior work, I understand white supremacy as a logic of social organization that produces regimented, institutionalized, and militarized conceptions of hierarchized ‘human’ difference, enforced through coercions and violences that are conditioned by genocidal possibility, including physical extermination and curtailment of people’s collective capacities to socially, culturally, or biologically reproduce (Rodríguez 2006). As a ‘national’ vernacular and institutional modality of domination, white supremacy is both based on, and constantly reshaping, notions of the white (European and Euroamerican) ‘human’-as-universal historical subject through both militarized liquidations and neutralizations of (non-white) other humans, and multiple institutional incorporations and empowerments of the whi It thus is within the confines of Homeland Security as white supremacist territoriality – a structure of feeling that organizes the cohesion of racial and spatial entitlement – that ‘multiculturalism’ is recognized as a fact of life, an empirical feature of the world that is inescapable and unavoidable, something to be tolerated, policed, and patriotically valorized at once and in turn. On the one hand, white locality is a site of existential identification that generates (and therefore corresponds to) a white supremacist materiality. As subjects (including ostensibly ‘non-white’ subjects) identify with this sentimental structure – a process that is not cleanly agential or altogether voluntary – they enter a relation of discomforting intimacy with embodied threats to their sense of the ‘local’. Those alien bodies and subjects, whose movement suggests the possibility of disruption and disarticulation, become objectste subject’s/body’s racial antagonists.

The ascendance of the Obama administration signifies this complex tension between universal (white) humanity, “non-white” subjection to logics of disposability/genocide, and multiculturalist empowerment in continuity with the violence of the white supremacist state. White supremacy is historically characterized by a periodic flexibility of phenotype (e.g. “first black president” as white supremacist nation-building’s moral/political vindication) that is already determined by the structural durability of the social logics of racial dominance/violence. Thus, To consider white supremacy as essential to American national formation (rather than an extremist deviation or incidental departure from it) inaugurates a deeper theorization of how this material logic of violence overdetermines the social, political, economic, and cultural structures that compose American white locality/globality and, crucially, generates the common sense indispensable to its ordering.

#### Our alternative is the abolition of domestic warfare.

Rodríguez Professor and Chair of the Department of Ethnic Studies at UC Riverside 2010 Dylan “The Terms of Engagement: Warfare, White Locality, and Abolition” Critical Sociology 36:1 Sage Publishing Online

The abolition of domestic warfare, not unlike precedent (and ongoing) struggles to abolish colonialism, slavery, and programmatic genocide, necessitates a rigorous theoretical and pragmatic approach to a counter- and anti-state radicalism that attempts to fracture the foundations of the existing US social form. This political shift requires a sustained labor of radical vision, and in the most crucial ways is actually anchored to ‘progressive’ notions of life, freedom, community, and collective/personal security (including safety from racist policing/criminalization and the most localized brutalities of neoliberal or global capitalism).

Not long from now, generations will emerge from the organic accumulation of rage, suffering, social alienation, and (we hope) politically principled rebellion against this living apocalypse and pose to us some rudimentary questions of radical accountability: How were we able to accommodate, and even culturally and politically normalize the strategic, explicit, and openly racist technologies of state violence that effectively socially neutralized and frequently liquidated entire nearby populations of our people, given that ours are the very same populations that have historically struggled to survive and overthrow such ‘classical’ structures of dominance as colonialism, frontier conquest, racial slavery, and other genocides? In a somewhat more intimate sense, how could we live with ourselves in this domestic state of emergency, and why did we seem to generally forfeit the creative possibilities of radically challenging, dislodging, and transforming the ideological and institutional premises of this condition of domestic warfare in favor of short term, ‘winnable’ policy reforms? (For example, why did we choose to formulate and tolerate a ‘progressive’ political language that reinforced dominant racist notions of ‘criminality’ in the process of trying to discredit the legal basis of ‘Three Strikes’ law?) What were the fundamental concerns of our progressive organizations and movements during this time, and were they willing to comprehend and galvanize an effective, or even viable opposition to the white supremacist state’s terms of engagement (that is, warfare)? This radical accountability reflects a variation on anticolonial liberation theorist Frantz Fanon’s memorable statement to his own peers, comrades, and nemeses:

Each generation must discover its mission, fulfill it or betray it, in relative opacity. In the underdeveloped countries preceding generations have simultaneously resisted the insidious agenda of colonialism and paved the way for the emergence of the current struggles. Now that we are in the heat of combat, we must shed the habit of decrying the efforts of our forefathers or feigning incomprehension at their silence or passiveness. (Fanon 2004 [1963]: 146)

Lest we fall victim to a certain political nostalgia that is often induced by such illuminating Fanonist exhortations, we ought to clarify the premises of the social ‘mission’ that our generation of USA-based progressive organizing has undertaken.

In the vicinity of the constantly retrenching social welfare apparatuses of the US state, much of the most urgent and immediate work of community-based organizing has revolved around service provision. Importantly, this pragmatic focus also builds a certain progressive ethic of voluntarism that constructs the model activist as a variation on older liberal notions of the ‘good citizen’. Following Fanon, the question is whether and how this mission ought to be fulfilled or betrayed. To respond to this political problem requires an analysis and conceptualization of ‘the state’ that is far more complex and laborious than we usually allow in our ordinary rush of obligations to build campaigns, organize communities, and write grant proposals. We require, in other words, a scholarly activist framework to understand that the state can and must be radically confronted on multiple fronts by an abolitionist social theory.

Effectively contradicting, decentering, and transforming the popular consensus (for example, destabilizing assertive assumptions common to progressive movements and organizations such as ‘we have to control/get rid of gangs,’ ‘we need prisons,’ or ‘we want better police’) is, in this context, dangerously difficult work. Although the truth of the matter is that the establishment US left, in ways both spoken and presumed, may actually agree with the political, moral, and ideological premises of domestic warfare. Leaders as well as rank-and-file members in avowedly progressive organizations can and must reflect on how they might actually be supporting and reproducing existing forms of racism, white supremacy, state violence, and domestic warfare in the process of throwing their resources behind what they perceive as ‘winnable victories’, in the lexicon of venerable community organizer Saul Alinsky.

Arguably, it is precisely the creative and pragmatic work of political fantasy/political vision/political imagination that is the most underdeveloped dimension of the US establishment left’s organizational modus operandi and public discourse. While a full discussion is best left for sustained collective discussion, we might consider the post-1960s history of the reactionary, neoconservative, and Christian fundamentalist US right, which has fully and eagerly engaged in these political labors of fantasy/vision/imagination, and has seen the desires of their wildest dreams met or exceeded in their struggles for political and cultural hegemony. It might be useful to begin by thinking of ourselves as existing in a relationship of deep historical obligation to the long and recent, faraway and nearby historical legacies of radical, revolutionary, and liberationist struggles that have made the abolition of oppressive violence their most immediate and fundamental political desire.

### State Storytelling Link

#### State storytelling is inseparable from its localized war waging

Rodríguez Professor and Chair of the Department of Ethnic Studies at UC Riverside 2010 Dylan “The Terms of Engagement: Warfare, White Locality, and Abolition” Critical Sociology 36:1 Sage Publishing Online

Koch’s manifesto builds a mechanism of self-legitimating violence: the state (here momentarily manifest in the person of the New York City mayor) constantly tells stories about itself, facilitated by a politically willing corporate media. This storytelling – which through repetition and saturation assembles the popular ‘common sense’ of domestic warfare – is inseparable from the on-the-ground shifting, rearranging, and recommitting of resources and institutional power that we witness in the everyday mobilizations of a state waging intense, localized, militarized struggle against its declared internal enemies, structurally embodied in the nationalist animus that epidermally3 (Fanon 1967) criminalizes black and indigenous populations and distends into localized racist state violence waged on differently racially and ethnically pathologized brown populations, from Puerto Ricans and Filipinos to Mexicans and Iranians.

#### State storytelling normalizes war-making

Rodríguez Professor and Chair of the Department of Ethnic Studies at UC Riverside 2010 Dylan “The Terms of Engagement: Warfare, White Locality, and Abolition” Critical Sociology 36:1 Sage Publishing Online

Generally, the state materializes and becomes comprehensible to both its anticipated and unexpected publics through such definitive moments of crafting: the state identifies itself as a series of active rhetorical, political, and institutional projects and mobilizations, many of which hinge on the marshalling of capacities for racist state violence (war). The state’s self-narration inundates and hails multiple publics with its discourse of policing and jurisprudence as the righteously punitive and justifiably violent front lines of an overlapping series of comprehensive, militarized, and culturally valorized domestic wars, whether the ‘war on drugs’, ‘war on crime’, ‘war on gangs’, ‘war on illegal immigration’, or ‘war on terror’. By extension, it is the material processes of war, from the writing of public policy to the hyper-weaponization of the police, that commonly represents the practical existence of the state as we come to normally ‘know’ it.

Domestic warfare has thus become both the common language and intensely materialized modality of the US state. While this form of legitimated state violence certainly predates Reagan’s ‘war on drugs’ and his/its inheritors, the scope and depth of domestic warmaking seems to be mounting with a peculiar urgency in our historical moment. To take former NYPD and current LAPD Chief William Bratton on the strength of his own words, the primary work of the police is to engage aggressively in ‘the internal war on terrorism’ (Garvey and Winton 2002), which in these times entails everything from record-breaking expansions of urban police forces (McGreevy 2007), to cross-party consensus in legislating state offensives against criminalized populations of choice (Rau 2007) and the reshuffling of administrative relationships between the militarized and juridical arms of local and federal government to facilitate the state’s various localized ‘wars on gangs’ (McGreevy and Winton 2007). This modality of domestic warmaking also, crucially, entails the discursive innovations of an emergent multiculturalist white supremacy, wherein authoritative embodiments of the ‘new’ post-civil rights racist state smoothly recapitulate the a priori of the nation-building project. Barack Obama’s now notorious 2008 Father’s Day speech at the Apostolic Church of God in Chicago, in which he scolded and cajoled ‘black fathers’ for ‘acting like boys instead of men’ and rendering ‘the foundations of our families … weaker’, also encompassed a back-door (and largely unnoticed) pledge of allegiance to the law-and-order state: ‘Yes, we need more cops on the street. Yes, we need fewer guns in the hands of people who shouldn’t have them.’ (Obama 2008) Crucially, Obama obtained an enthusiastic round of applause from his ostensibly progressive black audience on all rhetorical counts.

### Liberalism Link

#### Liberalism cannot address conditions of white supremacy

Rodríguez Professor and Chair of the Department of Ethnic Studies at UC Riverside 2010 Dylan “The Terms of Engagement: Warfare, White Locality, and Abolition” Critical Sociology 36:1 Sage Publishing Online

These projects mutually reproduce white bodily integrity as a fundamental and necessary national-racial entitlement, a historically situated reification that forms the political and conceptual premises of national, popular, and ‘critical’ discourses more generally. In both cases, I am concerned with displacing the arrested, default liberal political discourses and activist practices of an establishment/progressive left that is politically unwilling and structurally unable to adequately address the conditions of US white supremacy in its current articulations. Because the intent of these tracings is to suggest a genealogical trajectory rather than to fully exhaust the analytical and textual depths of each topic, the primary task of this essay is to clarify the premises and embedded implications of a specific analytical framework as well as to elaborate a political articulation that derives from this theoretical and conceptual positioning. I ask the reader to conceptualize this as praxis, or activist theoretical work, rather than a conventional academic essay that moves from the pretenses of objectivity or scientific disinterest.

I depart this prelude by asserting the historical (political) urgency and scholarly indispensability of a genealogy of the historical present that focuses on the multiple inceptions of this ‘unremarkable’ state of emergency: what is to be done (differently and radically, that is) when the proliferating statecraft of domestic warfare forming our material condition of possibility is conceptualized as having significantly emerged from the political genotype and institutional phenotype of the Goldwaterist articulation of the muscularly white supremacist ‘law and order’ state (Rodríguez 2006), which significantly rearranged and institutionally enabled the everyday domestic warmaking capacities of the US state? (Gilmore 2007). How might such a conceptualization productively displace and rearticulate our terms of (political) engagement such that we no longer misrecognize (and depoliticize) a warfare assemblage that is neither foreign nor elsewhere, but profoundly familiar and intimate?

### AT: Perm

#### White supremacy structures state, economic, cultural and social formations – cannot be remedied inside its structure

Rodríguez Professor and Chair of the Department of Ethnic Studies at UC Riverside 2010 Dylan “The Terms of Engagement: Warfare, White Locality, and Abolition” Critical Sociology 36:1 Sage Publishing Online

To revise the classical Marxist formulation, the sustenance of white bodily integrity is the structural logic that produces state, economic, cultural, and social formations, and is the usually unspoken discursive logic through which the ‘Homeland’ obtains its narrative and material gravity.2 The political crises and social contradictions that emerge from these arrangements – including those articulated as ‘antiwar’, ‘antiracist’, pro-civil and human rights, and pro-diversity – are inevitably and necessarily framed as conflicts to be decisively mediated by white civic subjects whose terrain of struggle is rendered coherent by the mandate of white bodily integrity. Suppression or resolution of crisis and contradication, in this case, can only be intelligible when articulated or (at least) sanctioned by a decisively white community of (national) interest, and it is here that white locality becomes a flexible, rigorously innovative formation of white supremacist dominance: the lived locality of Homeland/National Security is the propertied fantasy of embodied white subjects – from scales across the narcissistic individual to the audaciously collective or national, the fantasy of Homeland belongs to them – at a time when the discursive structures of white supremacy find coherence in the trappings of multiculturalism (consider the formulaic and rigorously enforced ‘diversity’ of the White House police forces, and the US military, for example).

#### Inclusion bad should be resisted – easily coopted by white supremacy

Rodríguez Professor and Chair of the Department of Ethnic Studies at UC Riverside 2010 Dylan “The Terms of Engagement: Warfare, White Locality, and Abolition” Critical Sociology 36:1 Sage Publishing Online

It thus is within the confines of Homeland Security as white supremacist territoriality – a structure of feeling that organizes the cohesion of racial and spatial entitlement – that ‘multiculturalism’ is recognized as a fact of life, an empirical feature of the world that is inescapable and unavoidable, something to be tolerated, policed, and patriotically valorized at once and in turn. On the one hand, white locality is a site of existential identification that generates (and therefore corresponds to) a white supremacist materiality. As subjects (including ostensibly ‘non-white’ subjects) identify with this sentimental structure – a process that is not cleanly agential or altogether voluntary – they enter a relation of discomforting intimacy with embodied threats to their sense of the ‘local’. Those alien bodies and subjects, whose movement suggests the possibility of disruption and disarticulation, become objects of a discrete discursive labor as well as material/military endeavors. Most importantly, they become specified and particularized sites for white locality’s punitive performances: racialized punishment, capture, and discipline are entwined in the historical fabric of white supremacist social formations from conquest and chattel enslavement onward, and the emergence of white locality’s hypermobility has necessitated new technologies commensurate with the hyperpresence – actual and virtual – of white subjectivities. As white bodies and subjects exert the capacity to manifest authority and presence in places they both do and do not physically occupy (call the latter ‘absentee’ white supremacy for shorthand), the old relations of classical white supremacist apartheid are necessarily and persistently reinvented: racial subjection becomes a technology of inclusion that crucially accompanies – and is radically enhanced by – ongoing proliferations of racist state and state-sanctioned violence.

Further, this logic of multiculturalist white supremacist inclusion does not exclusively rely on strategies of coercion or punishment to assimilate others – such as in the paradigmatic examples of bodily subjection that formed the institutional machinery of Native American boarding and mission schools (Adams 1995; Smith 2005), but instead builds upon the more plastic and sustainable platforms of consensus and collective identity formation. I do not mean to suggest that either consensus building or identity formation are benign projects of autonomous racial self-invention, somehow operating independently of the structuring relations of dominance that characterize a given social formation. Rather, I am arguing that the social technologies of white supremacy are, in this historical moment, not reducible to discrete arrangements of institutionalized (and state legitimated) violence or strategies of social exclusion (Da Silva 2007) but are significantly altered and innovated through the crises of bodily proximity that white locality bears to its alien (and even enemy) populations. It is in these moments of discomfort, when white locality is internally populated by alien others who have neither immigrated nor invaded the space, but have in multiple ways become occupied by the praxis of white locality construction, that logics of incorporation and inclusion become crucial to the historical project of white supremacist globality.

#### Dis-identify with the state is necessary to revolutionary insurgency

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The regularity with which progressive organizations immediately forfeit the crucial political and conceptual possibilities of abolishing domestic warfare is a direct reflection of the extent to which domestic war has been fashioned into the everyday, ‘normal’ reality of the state. By extension, the non-profit industrial complex, which is fundamentally guided by the logic of being state-sanctioned (and often state-funded), also reflects this common reality: the operative assumptions of domestic warfare are taken for granted because they form and inform the popular consensus.

Our historical moment suggests the need for a principled political rupturing of existing techniques and strategies that fetishize and fixate on the negotiation, massaging, and management of the worst outcomes of domestic warfare. One political move long overdue is toward grass roots pedagogies of radical dis-identification with the state, in the trajectory of an anti-nationalism or anti-patriotism, that reorients a progressive identification with the creative possibilities of insurgency (this is to consider ‘insurgency’ as a politics that pushes beyond the defensive maneuvering of ‘resistance’). While there are rare groups in existence that offer this kind of nourishing political space (fromthe L.A.-based Youth Justice Coalition to the national organization INCITE! Women of Color Against Violence), they are often forced to expend far too much energy challenging both the parochialisms of the hegemonic non-profit apparatus and the sometimes narrow politics of the progressive US left.

### Alt Solves

#### Abolition of domestic warfare is the first priority – don’t trust progressives willingness to align with state structures

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It is in this context that we can urgently assume the political burden of critically assessing the work of progressive USA-based community and non-profit organizations, grass roots movements, and issue-based campaigns: that is, if critical scholars, progressive and radical scholar activists, and antiviolence movements are to take the state’s own language of domestic warfare seriously, what are they to make of the political, ideological, institutional, and financial relationships that progressive movements, campaigns, and organizations are creating in (uneasy) alliance with the state’s vast architectures of war? Under what conditions and sets of assumptions are progressive activists, organizers, and scholars able to so militantly oppose the proliferation of American state violence in other parts of the world, while tolerating the everyday and nearby state violence of US policing, criminal law, and low-intensity genocide?

I am suggesting the necessity of a critical examination of the political and institutional logics that structure the US progressive left, and particularly the ‘establishment’ left that is tethered (for better and worse) to what many activists and scholars have begun calling the US non-profit industrial complex (NPIC). I have defined the NPIC elsewhere as the set of symbiotic relationships that link political and financial technologies of state and owning class social control with surveillance over public political discourse, including and especially emergent progressive and leftist social movements (Smith 2007: 8). This definition is most focused on the industrialized incorporation, accelerated since the 1970s, of pro-state liberal and progressive campaigns and movements into a spectrum of government-proctored non-profit organizations (Rodríguez 2007: 21). It is in the context of the formation of the NPIC as a political power structure that I wish to address a peculiar and disturbing politics of assumption that often structures, disciplines, and actively shapes the work of even the most progressive movements and organizations within the US establishment left: that is, the left’s willingness to fundamentally tolerate – and accompanying unwillingness to abolish – the institutionalized dehumanization of the contemporary policing and imprisonment apparatus (an apparatus that should be distinguished from the formal institutionalities of the ‘criminal justice’ system) in its most localized, unremarkable, and hence ‘normal’ manifestations within the domestic ‘homeland’ of the Homeland Security state.

### AT: What is the Result of the Alt

#### Abolition is not the search for a pragmatic solution – the alternative introduces a set of disruptive questions meant to illuminates oppressive logics.

Davis & Rodriguez 2000 Angela teaches in the History of Consciousness program at the University of California-Santa Cruz & Dylan Department of Ethnic Studies at the University of California, Berkeley “The challenge of prison abolition: A conversation” Social Justice 27.3 proquest

Dylan: I think you make a subtle but important point here: prison and penal abolition imply an analysis of society that illuminates the repressive logic, as well as the fascistic historical trajectory, of the prison's growth as a social and industrial institution. Theoretically and politically, this "radical position," as you call it, introduces a new set of questions that does not necessarily advocate a pragmatic "alternative" or a concrete and immediate "solution" to what currently exists. In fact, I think this is an entirely appropriate position to assume when dealing with a policing and jurisprudence system that inherently disallows the asking of such fundamental questions as: Why are some lives considered more disposable than others under the weight of police policy and criminal law? How have we arrived at a place where killing is valorized and defended when it is organized by the state -- I'm thinking about the street lynchings of Diallo and Dorismond in New York City, the bombing of the MOVE organization in Philadelphia in 1985, the ongoing bombing of Iraqi civilians by the United States -- yet viciously avenged (by the state) when committed by isolated individuals? Why have we come to associate community safety and personal security with the degree to which the state exercises violence through policing and criminal justice? You've written elsewhere that the primary challenge for penal abolitionists in the United States is to construct a political language and theoretical discourse that disarticulates crime from punishment. In a sense, this implies a principled refusal to pander to the typically pragmatist impulse to demand absolute answers and solutions right now to a problem that has deep roots in the social formation of the United States since the 1960s. I think your open-ended conception of prison abolition also allows for a more comprehensive understanding of the prison-industrial complex as a set of institutional and political relationships that extend well beyond the walls of the prison proper. So in a sense, prison abolition is itself a broader critique of society. This brings me to the next question: What are the most crucial distinctions between the political commitments and agendas of prison reformists and those of prison abolitionists?

### AFF ANSWER

#### Abolitionism doesn’t require the rejection of the plan. Providing education to prisoners doesn’t trade off with an abolitionist agenda.

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Angela: The seemingly unbreakable link between prison reform and prison development -- referred to by Foucault in his analysis of prison history -- has created a situation in which progress in prison reform has tended to render the prison more impermeable to change and has resulted in bigger, and what are considered "better," prisons. The most difficult question for advocates of prison abolition is how to establish a balance between reforms that are clearly necessary to safeguard the lives of prisoners and those strategies designed to promote the eventual abolition of prisons as the dominant mode of punishment. In other words, I do not think that there is a strict dividing line between reform and abolition. For example, it would be utterly absurd for a radical prison activist to refuse to support the demand for better health care inside Valley State, California's largest women's prison, under the pretext that such reforms would make the prison a more viable institution. Demands for improved health care, including protection from sexual abuse and challenges to the myriad ways in which prisons violate prisoners' human rights, can be integrated into an abolitionist context that elaborates specific decarceration strategies and helps to develop a popular discourse on the need to shift resources from punishment to education, housing, health care, and other public resources and services.